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DAILY INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

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SD-~~[illegible]~~-69
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by D S Tait on [illegible]

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29 SEP 1958
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6 November 1950

DAILY INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

FAR EAST

KOREA (TOP SECRET) AR 380-5 par 60 c (FEC Cable) 8116

CINCFE reports that it is impossible at this time to appraise authoritatively the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.

Based upon such combat intelligence as has been received, CINCFE regards the following as possibilities:

(1) The Chinese Communist Government proposes to intervene openly and in full strength; (2) it will render military assistance but will, so far as is possible, conceal the fact; (3) it is permitting and abetting a flow of more or less voluntary personnel to assist remnants of the North Korean Army to maintain a nominal foothold in Korea; and (4) such intervention as exists has been made in the belief that no forces other than those of South Korea would be committed in the Korea-Manchuria border area. (An estimate that the South Korean forces would be inadequate for the purpose may well have been the basis for this action.)

CINCFE comments that the first contingency is a distinct possibility, but points out that there are many fundamental, logical reasons against it and that sufficient evidence has not yet appeared to warrant its immediate acceptance.

The last three possibilities or a combination thereof are considered more likely at present. CINCFE cautions against drawing hasty and possibly premature conclusions, pending a final appraisal based on a more complete accumulation of facts.

Comment: G-2 is in substantial agreement with the conclusions of CINCFE.

CHINA (TOP SECRET) AR 380-5 par 60 c (AF Cable) IR-103-50

The Air Attaché, Taipei, forwards a report allegedly transmitted by Father Wang (an active anti-Communist in North China, according to the document) to a friend in Hong Kong through a Father Li.

Father Wang reportedly obtained the information from a religious friend who is employed in the Administration Council in Peking. This friend came into possession of a document in connection with his duties. When he noticed its extreme importance, he supposedly memorized the contents and later reproduced them for Father Wang.

The reporting officer places an evaluation of F-2 on this information.

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By authority of AGSI letter dated 24 March 1953

~~TOP SECRET~~ by DS Tait on 1/29/60

The most sensational part of this report outlines the activity at a meeting of the Chinese Communist Party Central Bureau allegedly held in Peking on 14 August 1950.

This meeting was attended by the heads of the Chinese Communist Government and high-ranking foreigners including Soviet, French, Czech, German, and Polish representatives. At this international meeting a directive of the Cominform was disclosed. In summary, this directive called for all proletariats to establish a united front to destroy the "aggressive designs of the American imperialists". All nations also must prepare for another disastrous war, and the Chinese must deploy troops for the Korean War.

Included in the subject report, in addition to the above, are other reports, with various sources. Some of these are in direct contradiction to the information submitted by Father Wang. One item states that if the U.S. is successful in the Korean conflict, a political settlement will be sought to preserve the Korean boundary.

To avert World War III, all Soviets immediately were withdrawn from Korea after President Truman's announcement of U.N. aid to South Korea.

Comment: The following factors appear to militate against unreserved acceptance of this document:

a.--The documents, from which a microfilm copy was made by the Air Attaché, Taipei, were secured from a messenger to the Nationalist Secret Police.

b.--Many of the items are almost identical with information previously received by G-2 and originating in the Ministry of National Defense (MND) (20 Sep 1950)*.

c.--Part of the information largely is a repetition of portions of a report which allegedly originated with a Father Li. (24 September 1950). Li was discredited by an investigation made by the U.S. Army Liaison Officer, Hong Kong. No Catholic institution knew of his existence.

d.--A messenger for a security agency which has such a thorough system for collection of information apparently would be running a risk out of proportion to possible profit in turning over such valuable information to a foreigner before delivering it to his agency.

e.--While much of the information contains elements of truth, and other portions of it could well be credible, the foregoing factors indicate an evaluation of F-2 or, at the very highest, F-3.

*See DIB, 25 Sep 50.

The foregoing illustrates the type of information emanating from Taipei. Since the MND possesses a proclivity to disseminate information so completely divergent in nature, an extreme reserve in the evaluation of this information is mandatory.

While the MND unquestionably comes into possession of information of an extremely valuable and reliable nature, its tendency to allow propaganda purposes to enter into intelligence matters decreases, to a large degree, the value of this source.

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By authority of ACSI letter dated 24 March 1959

by D. J. Tait on JUN 22 1960